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BRIEF OF PETITIONER
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Is petitioner entitled to the benefits of Utan

Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1953, as amended), for permanent total
disability benefits based upon his physical impairments arising
out of the industrial injury, pre-existing conditions and other
extrinsic conditions, including age, education, employment
skills and physical impairments?
2.

Did the Industrial Commission of Utah act

arbitrarily or capriciously in reversing an order of the
Administrative Law Judge awarding permanent total disaoili^y
benefits?
3.

Did the Industrial Commission of Utah commit error

of law by (1) misapplying the standard for review of an
Administrative Law Judge's order; (2) misapplying the law
related to employers' burden of proof in odd-lot cases; or (3)

failing to consider substantial uncontroverted evidence of
permanent total disability?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Alma E. Peck is a 65-year-old industrial maintenance
mechanic who sustained several recent industrial injuries
involving his left knee (September 12, 1980); right foot
(November 16, 1982); and low back (December 19, 1982).

The

back and knee problems necessitated surgery and left claimant
with permanent disability.

The applicant sought industrial

benefits for temporary total, permanent partial and permanent
total disability under the provisions of Title 35 of the Code.
All benefits were denied by his employer, Eimco Process
Equipment Co.
Mr. Peck filed for a hearing and presented evidence of
accidental injuries occurring during the course of his
employment.

That evidence is uncontroverted and apparently not

at issue on appeal.

Subsequent to the initial hearing and

submission to a medical panel, the Administrative Law Judge,
adopting the findings of the medical panel, determined the
following impairments pre-existed the September 12, 1980
accident:
1.

Right ankle - 7%;

2.

Hearing loss - 5%;

3.

Cervical - 5%;

4.

Left wrist - 2%;

5.

Left knee - 2%;

6.

Right arm - 1%.
-2-

A combined whole-body rating of 21%, together with an
additional 3% for cervical degeneration, subsequent to
September 1980 but before the December 1982 accident, was
rendered to the applicant by the medical panel for a whole-body
combined rating of 24%.
The medical panel then rated the September 1980 injury
to the right knee at 2% and the December 1982 low back injury
at 10%.

Thus, 12% impairment was due to the industrial

accidents, combining with the pre-existing 24% to 33%
whole-body disability (R.179-188).
As of the date of the hearing, applicant was 64 years
of age.

He attended high school in Carey, Idaho, having

graduated in 1937 and essentially had no other formal
education.

Since that date, his work was considered primarily

labor with emphasis in welding, blacksmithing and maintenance,
all of which required significant movement and lifting ability.
Subsequent to the surgery necessitated by the December
1982 industrial injury, and following his convalescence, the
applicant returned to light-duty work with Eimco in June 1983.
His light-duty restrictions were not released (R.166).

Mr.

Peck testified that he was not able to perform his normal work
activities but for the charity of individuals working with him
(R.166).

This situation continued through a reorganization of

the department and until a time when the applicant felt that
his presence in the department was a liability to himself and
others with whom he worked (R.168).

Thus, after approximately

nine months, Mr. Peck terminated employment.
-3-

It was never his

intent to voluntarily retire since he had no other income and
little retirement (R.168).

The only amount he receives from

Eimco for full retirement benefits is $53.30 per month (R.174),
out of which $34.00 per month is deducted for his spouse's
health insurance (R.169).

This net sum, $19.30 per month, is

hardly an incentive to voluntarily terminate employment w m c h
provided an opportunity to earn in excess of $1,800.00 per
month (R.15).
Mr. Peck then applied for consideration of permanent
total disability benefits (R.126).

A separate evidentiary

hearing was held, after which Mr. Peck was referred to Mr.
Richard Olson, a rehabilitation counselor with the State
Rehabilitation Office, who determined that applicant was not a
good candidate for rehabilitation because of his age, physical
impairment, continued deterioration in his health, and the
general overall appearance of a man who has worked an extended
time and was then, and is now, suffering from physical
impairments and general deterioration associated with age
(R.217).

The Administrative Law Judge then ordered payments of

permanent total disability based upon applicant's age,
education and medical infirmities.

It is upon that order that

the Second Injury Fund and the employer appealed to the
Industrial Commission.

The Commission reversed, holding that

applicant had voluntarily retired and was thus not entitled to
the permanent total benefits awarded.

-4-

This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Applicant is permanently totally disabled and

should receive benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67.
2.

The Industrial Commission's denial of benefits is

contrary to law.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPLICANT IS PERMANENTLY TOTALLY DISABLED
AND SHOULD RECEIVE BENEFITS PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-67.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order set
forth Mr. Peck's prima facie claim to permanent total
disability benefits under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67.

A separate

hearing was held for the specific purpose of determining Mr.
Peck's status.

Thereafter, Mr. Peck was referred to the

Rehabilitation Office in accordance with the mandate of Section
35-1-67.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, while

relucantly given, were consistent with this Court's holding

m

Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah
1984).

The order is also consistent with numerous other

holdings of this Court.

Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622

P.2d 790 (Utah 1981); Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981).
The Industrial Commission reversed the Administrative
Law Judge's order agreeing with defendants' arguments that
since the applicant returned to work after his surgery and
before his termination from employment, then, a_ fortiori, Mr.
Peck was able to return to his normal and usual occupation, and

-5-

therefore vas forever barred from claiming the benefits of
Section 35-1-67.

Such a narrow interpretation cf that section

/ould ^e^i rhat once an individual attempts to return to /orK,
light duty or otherwise, he has become forever barred from
suosequen^ly seeking permanent total disability benefits.

That

interpretation is wholly inconsistent with prior holdincis or
this Court.

See Meacham v. Industrial Commission ot Utah, t>a2

P.2d 783 (Utah 1984); Buxton v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978).
The Commission's rationale is also inconsistent with
the odd-lot doctrine recognized in virtually every jurisdiction
and specifically adopted in the recent case of Marshall v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, supra.

That doctrine holds that

total disability may be found in workers who, while not
altogether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they
will not be employed regularly m
labor market.

any well known branch ot the

The essence of the test is the probable

dependability with which a claimant can sell his services in a
competitive labor market undistorted by such factors as
business oooms, sympathy from employer cr fellow workers, zi
superhuman efforts despite the claimant's crippling handicaps
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.51 at 10-154.49; :ee
also, § 57.64(b) at 10-164.154 through 10-164.164.
Elements of the odd-lot doctrine include irregularity
or unpredictability of the quality, quantity and overall
performance of the employee's work record.

-6-

These elements were

clearly shown to have existed in favor of a finding that Alma
Peck was not able to continue in his normal occupation.
Many states, including our own, only require that the
claimant demonstrate a prima facie case for total disability.
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the
availability of steady work regularly available to him.
Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra.

Among the

classifications of cases defined as "odd-lot" are a number of
cases involving a voluntary quitting with no element of
misconduct.

If a claimant quits his job for reasons having

nothing to do with an industrial injury, obviously he should
not be entitled to claim permanent total benefits.

However, if

a claimant quits because he cannot continue to perform his
former duties primarily because of pain or other functional
incapacity left by reason of pre-existing conditions and his
industrial injury, the quitting then forms no impediment to a
finding of compensable permanent total disability.

While the

number of reasons for quitting are limited, the central issue
is the same: Was the disability in any significant degree a
factor in the decision to resign or retire?

If the motive is

merely to get a better job or to obtain more job security,
change residence or family status, then the answer is no.
There are few cases directly on point where the reasons for
quitting were because of continuous pain, reduced quantity or
quality of work performance, and fear of creating danger to
others.

Most, however, have applied the procedure adopted by

-7-

this Court in Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
supra.

See 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.64(b),

supra.

If the applicant is able to demonstrate a prima facie

entitlement, then the burden should shift to the employer.

In

this matter, the employer was given every opportunity to defend
and to present evidence of steady employment available to Mr.
Peck, but failed to do so.
Defendants may argue that their burden was met by
merely demonstrating the applicant returned to work in
approximately June 1983, and continued to work until his
retirement in April 1984.

This contention, whether adopted by

the Industrial Commission, the Adminitrative Law Judge or the
defendants, is simply inconsistent with uncontradicted and
believable substantial evidence to the contrary.

Applicant

testified that he needed to work beyond his 65th birthday in
order to qualify for meaningful benefits (R.169), not for the
rather meager sum of $53.00 gross per month.

Yet, because of

his physical inability, pain, charity from fellow workers and
belief that he could constitute a danger to others, he was
forced to quit.

Had he been able to continue his work, he

would have built upon a meaningful retirement benefit and would
have been able to save for the future.

Since this industrial

injury contributed in major part to his termination, Mr. Peck
should rightfully be entitled to the continued benefits of the
Worker's Compensation Act.
The employer cannot meet its burden through Mr. Peck's
testimony.

The monetary facts and vocational findings all
-8-

support the Adminstrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order awarding permanent total
disability benefits.
II.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DENIAL
OF BENEFITS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

The rule of law in this and other odd-lot cases is
clearly and umambiguously set forth in Marshall v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, supra.

For that reason, the Administrative

Law Judge felt compelled to award benefits to Mr. Peck in spite
of his personal belief to the contrary.

Clearly, Mr. Peck had

demonstrated a prima facie case; clearly the employer failed to
meet its shifted burden of proof.
Defendants may assert that the Administrative Law
Judge "found that the applicant did in fact return to work and
did perform the previous duties required in his occupation"
(R.228).

Such a finding, if upheld, is wholly unsupported by

any evidence in the record.
is to the contrary.

In fact, all substantial evidence

The Industrial Commission cannot simply

choose to disbelieve the applicant's uncontradicted testimony
simply to enforce their personal beliefs as to what the law is
or ought to be.
Defendants' argument that once an employee returns to
his former duties he is forever barred from obtaining benefits
under Section 35-1-67 is without merit and inconsistent with
the policy behind worker's compensation statutes.
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra.

See Meacham

Neither do these

arguments consider applicant's "progressive" disease for which
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the medical panel gave a 2.5% whole-body rating between
September 1980 and December 1982, and another 2.5% whole-body
rating since that date to the date of the panel evaluation.
This same progression was noted by the rehabilitation officer:
It is my feeling that Mr. Peck is not a good
candidate for rehabilitation because of his
age, physical impairment, continued deterioration in his health, including the arthritis
in his foot, and the general overall appearance
of a man who has worked an extended time and is
now suffering from the physical impairments and
the general deterioration associated with age
(R.217).
The Commission's order granting defendants' motion for
review was based entirely upon the Administrative Law Judge's
interpretation of law as set forth in Marshall v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, supra.

The Commission adopted the

defendants' argument that because Mr. Peck returned to work
following his light release by his doctors, Marshal1 did not
apply.

The Commission chose to reverse (rather than remand)

the order and thereby deprive applicant of permanent total
disability benefits.

At a minimum, the Commission failed in

its duty by not reviewing the substantive evidence presented by
the applicant concerning his reasons for termination and their
relationship to the industrial injury; failed to properly
consider or apply the holding of this Court in Marshall v.
Industrial Commission of Utah; and failed to afford applicant
procedural and substantive due process of law in choosing
simply to disbelieve his uncontroverted testimony.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons specifically set forth by this Court
in Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, the applicant,
Alma E. Peck, should be entitled to receive permanent total
disability benefits.

The Industrial Commission's summary

reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Oraer awarding such benefits is wholly
inconsistent with law, ignores substantial uncontroverted
evidence of permanent total disability, and is arbitrary and
capricious.

It is respectfully suggested that this Court

vacate the Industrial Commission's Order and remand this matter
to enter the original Order granting permanent total benefits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ftf

day of February,

1986.
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Telephone: 801/533-8 383

By A

/"G-t^.

/^^y^^^^~

^ yRoqei^B<

Sandack

Attorney for Applicant
2702L
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A D D E N D U M

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALMA E. PECK,
Petitioner,

;)

vs.

;

EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO.,
SECOND INJURY FUND and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,

])

DOCKETING STATEMENT

Case No. 20914

;

Respondents.

Petitioner respectfully submits the following
Docketing Statement pursuant to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure:
I. JURISDICTION
Authority to review this matter is conferred upon this
Court by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 (1953, as amended).
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a Final Order of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Workmen's Compensation Division.
III. DATE OF ORDER
Petitioner seeks review of the Industrial Commission's
Order Granting Motion for Review, dated August 30, 1985, by the
filing of a Petition for Writ of Review, dated September 27,
1985.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner is a 65-year-old industrial mechanic
employed by respondent Eimco Process Equipment Co.

Petitioner

suffered a back injury as a result of an industrial accident
occurring during the course of his employment on December 19,
1982.

As a result of this accident, subsequent back surgery

necessitated by the accident, several prior injuries received
during the course of his employment with Emico Process
Equipment Co., and other pre-existing medical impairments, the
Medical Panel found permanent partial disability as follows:
Right ankle - 7%;
Hearing loss - 5%
Cervical - 10%;
Left wrist - 2%;
Left knee - 2%;
Right arm - 1%;
Right knee - 2%;
Low back - 10%.
The Industrial Commission found a combined 12%
permanent partial impairment due to the industrial accident of
December 1982, together with a combined 33% whole-body
disability due to all conditions using the Hair computations.
Petitioner requested a finding of permanent total
disability because of his age, education and medical
impairments.

After hearing, petitioner was referred to the

Utah State Department of Rehabilitation Services pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67, which found applicant was not a good
candidate for rehabilitation.

The Administrative Law Judge

then entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order
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awarding petitioner permanent total disability benefits
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67.
Respondent Second Injury Fund filed a motion to review
the Administrative Law Judge's decision principally upon the
ground that petitioner worked following his surgery and
voluntarily retired from his employment.

The Industrial

Commission granted this motion to review and entered its own
findings without ever seeing the petitioner or reviewing his
testimony that his work consisted of charity by fellow workers
and that he was forced to retire in spite of his previous
desire to continue working.
V. ISSUES
1.

Is the petitioner entitled to the benefits of Utah

Code Ann. § 35-1-67 for permanent total disability benefits
based upon his age, education, employment skills and physical
impairments?
2.

Did the Industrial Commission act arbitrarily by

failing to affirm the order of the Administrative Law Judge
awarding such permanent total disability benefits or by failing
to remand the same for further evidentiary findings if it felt
such were necessary?
VI. STATUTORY AND CASE LAW
Petitioner relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67, and
Noland Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 681 P.2d 208
(Utah 1984) .

-3-

VII. ATTACHMENTS
Attached hereto and made a part hereof are the
following necessary attachments:
1.

The Industrial Commission's Order Granting Motion

to Review, dated August 30, 1985;
2.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

entered by the Administrative Law Judge, dated February 28,
1985; and
3.

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Review, filed

September 27, 1985.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of October, 1985,
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Telephone: 8 01/53 3-83 83

landack
Attorneys for Petitioner
2532L
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that true and correct copies
foregoing DOCKETING STATEMENT were placed in the United States
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84114
Robert Finch, Esq.
559 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT
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Erie Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE No.83000275
*
ALMA E. PECK,

Applicant,
vs.
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO.,
and SECOND INJURY FUND
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On February 28, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission
issued an Order, which was supplemented by a later Order issued on March 26,
1985.
The two Orders taken together provided that the defendant company pay
permanent total disability*, benefits to the Applicant based on a percentage of
the whole person impairment which resulted due to two industrial accidents the
Applicant had while employed with the defendant company. The Second Injury
Fund was directed to pay the Applicant permanent total disability benefits
based on the percentage of the whole person impairment that existed prior to
the industrial injuries. Upon review of the file and the Administrative Law
Judge's Orders, the Commission is of the opinion that the case does not
warrant an award of permanent total disability benefits« A review of the file
follows.
The Applicant was employed with the defendant company as an
industrial maintenance mechanic. The industrial injuries at issue, in this
particular filing, involved a left knee injury which occurred on September 12,
1980,
which necessitated surgery which was performed on October 17, 1980.
There was next a right foot injury occurring on November 16, 1982, and
finally, a back injury on December 19, 1982. Following the back injury, the
Applicant returned to work, but was later hospitalized on March 17, 1983 for
back surgery.
The Applicant was discharged on March 24, 1983, and an
Application for Hearing was filed by the Applicant and his attorney on March
30, 1983. The Application stated that the Applicant sought permanent partial
impairment benefits as the result of the September 12, 1980 knee injury, and
the November 16, 1982 foot injury, as well as temporary total disability and
permanent partial impairment benefits for the December 29, 1982 back injury.
In answer to the Application, the defendant company stated that it sought
reimbursement from the Applicant for temporary total disability benefits and
medicals paid for the September 12, 1980 knee injury, as the defendant alleged
the defendant was not liable for these benefits it had paid as there was no
industrial accident.
The defendants further contended, that no further
benefits were due the Applicant for the November 16, 1982 foot injury, and no
benefits at all due the Applicant for the December 29, 1983 back injury, as no
accident occurred on that date either.

RECEIVED
Giauque & Williams

ALMA E. PECK
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
PAGE TWO

On June 27, 1983, the Applicant returned to work. On October 17,
1983 a hearing was held which resulted in an appointment of a medical panel on
October 19, 1983. On February 3, 1984, the Commission received the medical
panel report which is quoted extensively in the Administrative Law Judge1s
February 28, 1985 Order. On April 27, 1984, the Applicant turned sixty-five
years old, and on April 28, 1984, the Applicant retired from his position with
the defendant. The Applicant's attorney filed a generalized objection to the
medical panel report, which included a request for an award of permanent total
disability benefits for the Applicant on June 7, 1984. The Administrative Law
Judge wrote the Applicant and his attorney, and informed them that the request
for permanent total disability benefits was denied. A second hearing was held
on September 25, 1984. The medical panel submitted a clarification of the
medical panel report on October 5, 1984. On November 8, 1984, the Commission
received a report from a Rehabilitation Counselor of the Utah State Office of
Education, which concluded that the Applicant was not a good candidate for
rehabilitation due to the Applicant's age, physical impairment, and general
health deterioration.
On February 28, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge issued his
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Adopting the medical panel
findings as his own, he vawarded permanent total disability benefits citing,
Nolan Marshall v. Emery Mining, case No. 19153, filed April 5, 1984, as
precedent for the award.
The Administrative Law Judge stated in his
Conclusions of Law, that the Marshall case "mandated" the award of benefits,
and that he made the award "reluctantly". This reluctance is understandable
considering the Administrative Law Judge's further statements, that the
Applicant did not leave work on April 28, 1984 because of old or new injuries
and that the Applicant "just plain retired". The defendant filed objections
to the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on
March 18,1985, stating that the Marshall case could be factually distinguished
from the instant case, that the percentages the Administrative Law Judge used
did not correctly account for Hair adjustments, and that once again, there was
no compensable knee injury on September 12, 1980. In response to this, the
Administrative Law Judge issued a supplementary Order on March 26, 1985,
stating specifically th?-t compensable accidents occurred or. all three dates in
issue. A Motion for Review was filed by the Second Injury Fund, stating that
Applicant returned to work after his most recent industrial accident, which
disqualified the Applicant from receiving permanent total disability benefits,
based on the Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-6 7 requirement that the
Applicant show that industrial impairment prevented the Applicant from
performing his former work.
We agree with the arguments set forth by the defendants and the
Second Injury Fund.
The Marshall case involves a factual setting that is
different than the facts here involved. In the Marshall case, the Applicant
was unable to return to work after his industrial accident.
Here, the
Applicant obviously was able to return to work because in fact he did. The
Applicant worked for nearly one full year after his final industrial accident,
and retired one day after he turned sixty-five years old. The facts in this
case do not show that the Applicant has met his burden in showing inability to
return to work as is required by Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-69. And

ALMA E. PECK
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
PAGE THREE

because this case is factually dissimilar to the Marshall case, an award of
permanent total disability benefits to the instant Applicant is not "mandated"
by the holding in that case. Therefore, we reverse the Administrative Law
Judge's Orders of February 28, 1985 and March 26, 1985 and award instead,
permanent partial impairment benefits.
As we read the medical panel report, there were only two ratable
impairments as the result of the two industrial injuries on September 12, 1980
and December 29, 1982. The November 16, 1982 foot impairment did not result
in permanent impairment. The impairments pre-existing before September 12,
1980 were as follows:
WHOLE BODY IMPAIRMENT
7%
5%
5%
2%
2%
1%

Right ankle
Hearing
Cervical
Left wrist
Left knee
Right arm

Total Combined Pre-Existing Impairment
= 21%
Cervical
degeneration
occurring after the September 12, 1980
incident, and before the final industrial accident on December 29,1982,
amounted to 2.5% or an additional 3% causing the combined total pre-existing
impairment, at the time of the December 29, 1980 accident, to be 24% of the
whole body. The industrial impairments at issue in this case are only two.
Right knee
Back

9/12/80
12/29/82

2%
10%

Combined total of 12%

Using the Hair computation, the 12% represented above computes to a
total of 9% of the whole body, due to the pre-existing impairments. The total
impairment computes to 33% of the whole body (24% + 9%).
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the
defendants must pay 16 weeks of total temporary disability at the maximum rate
of $284.00 a week amounting to $4,544,00. This amount is subject to a 24/33
reimbursement by the Second Injury Fund which is equal to 73% of $4,544.00 or
$3,317.12. The permanent partial impairment the defendants must pay is 1.6%
of 312 weeks or 4.9 weeks at $153.00 per week ($749.70) for the 1980 accident
plus 7.4% of 312 weeks or 23 weeks at $189.00 per week ($4,347.00) for the
1982 accident totaling of $5,096.70. The permanent partial impairment the
Second Injury Fund must pay is 21% of 312 weeks, or 65.5 weeks, at $153.00 per
week ($10,021.50) for the pre-existing conditions as of September 12, 1980,
and 3% of 312 weeks or 9.3 weeks, at $189.00 per week ($1,757.70) for the
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cervical degeneration pre-existing the December 29, 1982 accident only,
totaling $11,779.20. All amounts due are accrued and are to be paid as lump
sums. The attorney*s fees payable to Roger D. Sandack are in the amount of
$3,962.68.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrative Law Judge's Orders of
February 28, 1985 and March 26, 1985 are hereby reversed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay Applicant at the rate of
$284.00 per week for 16 weeks or a total of $4,544.00 a? compensation for
temporary total disability less benefits paid heretofore.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay Applicant* compensation
at the rate of $153.00 per week for 4.9 weeks or a total of $749.70 as
compensation for 1.6% permanent partial impairment, and at the rate of $189.00
per week for 23 weeks or a total of $4,347.00 for 7.4% permanent partial
impairment, for a combined total of $5,096.70 which sum is accrued and payable
in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants pay all medical expenses
incurred as the result of this accident; said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay Roger D. Sandack,
attorney for the Applicant, the sum of $3,962.68, to be deducted from the
award specified above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer as Custodian
of the Second Injury Fund to reimburse the defendant to the extend of 73% of
the amounts expended herein for temporary total disability, and medical
expenses, upon the filing of a duly verified petition certifying the amounts
expended.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to pay to the Applicant at the rate of
$153.00 per week for 65.5 weeks, or a total of $10,021.50, as compensation for
pre-exisiting impairment consisting of 21% of the whole person, and at the
rate of $189.00 per week for 9.3 weeks, or a total of $1,757.70, for
pre-existing impairment consisting of 3% of the whole person, for a combined
total of $11,779.20 which sum is accrued and payable in a lump sum.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
_ £ 5 £ l ^ d a y o f August, 1985
ATTEST:

JML

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

Walter T. AxeigardtV
Commissioner

LenicV-L. Nielsen
Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on August
Granting of Motion for Review was mailed
following addresses, postage paid:

, 1985 a copy of the attached
to the following persons at the

Roger D. Sandack, Attorney, 500 Kearns Bldg., 136 South Main, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101
Robert Finch, Attorney, 559 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
Erie Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
Alma E. Peck, 56 West Sunset Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 83000275
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ALMA Ec PECK,
Applicant,
VS.
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT COMPANY,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

Defendant.
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARINGS:

1) Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 17, 1983, at 8:30
o'clock a.m.
2) Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on September 25, 1984, at 8:30
o'clock a.m.
Said hearings
Commission.

were

pursuant

to

Order

and

Notice

of

the

BEFORE:

Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Roger D. Sandack,
Attorney at Law.
The Defendant was represented
Law.

by Robert R. Finch, Attorney at

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The Applicant is claiming benefits for three separate incidents, each
of which he claims occurred during the course of his employment.
On September 12, 1980, the Applicant was crawling on a cement floor
and his right knee locked up. He was examined by Dr. Beck and surgery was
performed October 7, 1980. The Applicant had a similar operation on the left
knee back in the 1970's. On November 16, 1982, the Applicant was attempting
to loosen a pipe joint and was standing on a wrench when the pipe broke
allowing his right foot to come down hard causing immediate pain for which he
was taken to the emergency hospital. Medical benefits and temporary total
disability compensation were paid. The Applicant indicates that he still has
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some problem with the right foot and tends to walk more on the toe rather than
on the ball of the foot.
On December 29, 1982, the Applicant and an associate employee were
installing two eleven-foot sections of metal ladder. The lower section was
installed and in order to install the next section an employee was up above
pulling the ladder up by rope and the Applicant was walking up the lower
ladder lifting the new section with his arms. The upper end of the ladder
caught on something and the Applicant was jerking on the lower part of the
ladder with his right arm attempting to pull it out and away from whatever was
blocking it. As he was pulling with his right arm he felt a pain in his lower
back radiating into his hips. He told his partner to tie off the ladder
because he had hurt his back and then went immediately to report the incident
to his supervisor and ask for an additional man to complete the job. The
Applicant rested over the holiday, attempted to go back to work but found it
necessary to go to the company doctor January 11, 1983, who diagnosed his
problem as muscle spasms and prescribed medication and therapy with Robert
Greene and x-rays were taken at the Holy Cross Hospital. He was continued on
the job. While he was still taking therapy he was attempting to hook some
heavy cables onto a crane and felt additional intense pain. His back gave him
constant pain from that time on. Dr. Slawson recommended further examination
by Dr. Charles Rich who on February 21, took a CAT scan followed by a
myelogram and then surgery was performed March 17, 1983, with the Applicant
returning back to work June 27, 1983. No specific restrictions were imposed
but the treating physician instructed the Applicant and his employer that he
should be cautious with his back and not strain it. The Applicant indicated
that he had to be careful and continued to have some pain in his back and in
his right leg.
By way of history the Applicant had some ear infection problems in
the right ear but claimed no disability.
Sometime in 1960 he injured his
right elbow resulting in several operations.
In the 1950*s or *60's the
Applicant crushed his right ankle with a posthole digger which required
considerable treatment.
Back in about 1940 the Applicant had a horse fall
with him hurting his back for which he visited a chiropractor but had no other
medical treatment and lost no time from work. In 1970 the Applicant injured
his left knee while working for Ajax Press on which Dr. Kezerian performed
surgery. The Applicant also claimed some bronchial problems which give him
some difficulty if he is exposed to dust or smoke.
The
evaluation.
provided to
Report only
disability.
was received
of the Panel

medical aspects of the case were referred to a Medical Panel for
The Medical Panel returned its Report copies of which were
the various parties. The Applicant filed an objection to the
to preserve his claim for a finding of permanent and total
A hearing was held on the objections. The Medical Panel Report
in evidence and the Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings
as his own which are as follows:
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"(1) Applicant's physical impairment as a result of all causes and conditions
is as follows:
Body

1. Left knee
2. Right knee
3. Right foot

0%

4. Right ankle

25%

5.
6,
7.
8.
9,
10.

10%
2%
10%
5%
0%
0%

Back
Right upper ext
Cervical
Left wrist
Left hand
Right hand
11. Bronchial problems

12. Hiatus hernia
13. Hearing loss

5% lower ext.
5% lower ext.

2%
2%

Old industrial 1970
Industrial 9-12-80
Insufficient to rate 11-1682
Old injury & cause of foot
pain
Due to 12-29-82
Old problem shoulder-elbow
Non-industrial degeneration
Old fracture
Insufficient to rate
Insufficient to rate

0%
7%
10%
1%
10%
2%
0%
0%

0% (respiratory,
consultation by
Dr. Noehren)
0% (not further investigated-insufficient to rate)
32% right (audio-Binaural impairment
logy evaluation by
Rex Scott, M.S.)

5.33%

Physical impairment as a result of all causes and conditions is combined
to 33% permanent loss of body function.
"(2)
Applicant's permanent physical
injuries listed is as follows:

impairment

attributable

to

industrial

a.

9-12-80 Right knee 5% of lower extremity or 2% of body.

b.

11-16-82 Right foot, insufficient to rate, recurrent foot pain is a
result of limitation of motion of the ankle from old accident. 0%

c.

12-19-82 back 10% loss of body function.

Combined values of a. and c. 12% permanent loss of body function.
"(3) Pre-existing permanent physical impairment is listed as follows, whether
due to accidental injury, disease or congenital causes.
a. Prior to the date of 9-12-80
(1) Left knee 5% lower ext.
(A) Right ankle
25%

body
2%
7%
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(6) Right upper ext.
(7) Cervical
(8) Left wrist
(13) Hearing loss

2%
5%

1%

5% hand
32% right

5%
2%
5.33%

Binaural

Combined values equals 20% loss of body function.
Prior to the date of 11-16-82
Left knee
5% lower ext.
Right knee
5% lower ext.
Right ankle
25%
2%
Right arm
Cervical
7.5% (2.5 due to natural progression since 9-12-80)
(8) Left wrist
5%
(13) Hearing loss
32% right

2%
2%
7%
1%

(1)
(2)
(A)
(6)
(7)

All impairment
impairment.

pre--existing

11-16-82

combines

to

7.5%

2%
5.3%

25%

permanent

physical

c. Permanent physical impairment pre-existing 12-29-82 is unchanged from b.
inasmuch as no permanent impairment was assigned to the alleged foot injury of
11-16-82.
••There has been a 2.5% increase of the cervical spine due to natural progression between 9-12-80 and 12-29-82. There has been a further 2.5% increase in
the cervical spine due to natural causes from 12-29-84 to the present. These
are included above in their proper places."
The overall combined impairment is 33%, 12% of which is related to
industrial causes. Though the Panel indicates pre-existing was 25% we note
that part of that included an industrial injury from 1980 and therefore we are
treating the pre-existing as 21%.
The Applicant requested a finding of
permanent and total disability pursuant to the standards set in the John
Marshall v. Industrial Commission case of April 1984. The matter was referred
to the rehabilitation counsellor who found that the Applicant, who is now
sixty-five years old, together with his other deteriorating health conditions
was not a good candidate for rehabilitation.
With great reluctance the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
Applicant is permanently and totally disabled under the present case holdings,
and is entitled to benefits accordingly.
We believe the Marshall case
mandates such a finding but we do believe the finding in that case is in
error. Workmen^ compensation benefits should not be confused with retirement
benefits and should not be brought into a retirement situation either to be a
substitute for or a supplement to retirement. In this case the Applicant was
last injured December 29, 1982. After treatment and surgeries he returned to
work June 27, 1983, and worked up to his sixty-fifth birthday on April 22,
1984, and voluntarily terminated on April 28, 1984.
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The Applicant worked effectively before the December 1982 injury
despite his 27% pre-existing impairment which included such things as hearing
loss. The December 1982 incident only added a 10% impairment. The Applicant
was able to work effectively in his job for about a year after his injuries
healed.
There is no evidence of a new injury, nor is there any medical
evidence that the Applicant was taken off the job April 28, 1984, because of
his old injuries.
The Applicant just plain retired.
He will now draw
retirement benefits, Social Security and $241.00 per week for a comfortable
rest of his life. By this reasoning many workers nearing retirement with
previous injuries are also entitled to a nice comfor- table workmen's
compensation retirement program.
There is no issue of temporary total disability compensation.
However, it must be noted that the Applicant received temporary total
disability benefits following his December 1982 accident for the period from
March 7, 1983, to June 27, 1983, at 16 weeks x $284.00 = $4,544.00. The
Applicant was earning a sufficient income to entitle him to the maximum
benefit for permanent and total disability of $241.00 per week for 312 weeks
which would result in a total entitlement of $75,192.00. The Defendant should
pay 12/33 or 36% of that amount which would equal 112.32 weeks less 16 weeks
paid in temporary total disability benefits for a balance of 96.32 weeks,
which when multiplied times $241.00 would equal $23,213.12c Payment should be
made in a lump sum as accumulated from April 28, 1984, to February 22, 1985, a
period of 43 weeks which when multiplied times $241.00 would equal $10,363.00
to be paid in a lump sum. The balance is to be paid at the rate of $241.00
per week until the balance is paid somewhere near June 22, 1986. Thereafter,
the Second Injury Fund would commence payment on the balance due computed at
the rate of 64% of 312 weeks or 199.68 weeks which when multiplied times
$241.00 would equal $48,122.88 payment of which would commence at the expiration of payments by the Defendant Company on or about March 1, 1986, and
continued until paid in full. After the conclusion of the 312 weeks the
Applicant is entitled to continued benefits at the rate of $241.00 per week
from the Second Injury Fund unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
Applicant's
attorney
is entitled to attorney's fees based on
$75,192.00 less $4,544.00 already paid in temporary total disability benefits
or $70,648.00 in accordance with the Commission's formula, which would equal
$10,065.00. We further note Ronald C. Barker performed legal services for
Applicant and may be entitled to a portion of attorney's fees awarded if not
already paid for his services.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Defendant Company and the Second Injury Fund should pay the sums
set forth above.
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ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant Company pay the Applicant
$23,213.12 with $10,363.00 to be paid in a lump sum and the balance payable at
the rate of $241.00 per week commencing on or about February 22, 1985, until
about March 1, 1986.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the
Second Injury Fund, pay the Applicant compensation based on 64% permanent
total impairment at the rate of $241.00 per week for 199.68 weeks in the
amount of $48,122.88 commencing with said weekly payment on or about June 22,
1986, when payments from the Defendant Company terminate.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant pay all medical expenses
incurred as the result of this accident, in accordance with the Medical and
Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Roger D. Sandack, Attorney for the
Applicant, be paid the sum of $10,065.00, the same to be deducted from the
aforesaid award.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed this
Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Keith E. Sohm
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
<f/ti\^
day of February, 1985.
ATTEST:

/s/ Linda J. Strasburg
Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on the
J}%4)^
day of February, 1985, a copy of the
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Eimco Process Equipment Company
Attention: E.W. Chapman
P.O. Box 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Robert R. Finch, Attorney at Law
559 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
Alma E. Peck
56 West Sunset Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Roger D. Sandack, Attorney at Law
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALMA E. PECK,

)

Petitioner,

])

PETITION FOR W R I T

OF REVIEW
vs.

]

EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT CO.
SECOND INJURY FUND and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,

])

Case N o .

]

Respondents.

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
Petitioner Alma E. Peck, by and through his attorney
of record, Roger D. Sandack, hereby petitions this honorable
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83 to review a Final
Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah granting a Motion
for Review filed by respondents, on the grounds and for the
reasons that the Industrial Commission acted in excess of its
powers, arbitrarily and capriciously and without substantial
evidence and in violation of law in modifying a Final Order by
an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission, dated
March 26, 1985, by denying permanent total disability to
petitioner, Alma E. Peck.
Petitioner alleges in support hereof as follows:
1.

That on or about February 28, 1985, an

Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission issued an
Order, supplemented on March 26, 1985, which ordered defendants

to pay to petitioner permanent total disability benefits based
upon findings by the Administrative Law Judge that the
petitioner was permanently totally disabled, and accordingly
entitled to the benefits under Utah's workmen's compensation
laws.
2.

Respondents filed a Motion to Review the

Administrative Law Judge's finding, which motion was granted by
Order dated August 30, 1985,

The Industrial Commission's Order

granting respondents' Motion to Review is not supported by fact
or law.

More specifically, the Industrial Commission found

that the petitioner had been able to return to work after the
industrial injury.

The Industrial Commission completely

ignored the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, the full
and complete testimony of the petitioner that he was unable to
perform his work and was allowed to continue only with the
charity of fellow workers, and in fact was forced to retire by
Eimco Corporation.

As found by the report of the rehabilita-

tion counselor of the Utah State Office of Education, the
petitioner was not a good candidate for rehabilitation and in
fact was permanently totally disabled.
3.

Petitioner has not received any payment for the

industrial injury which was sustained, as found not only by the
Administrative Law Judge but also by the Industrial
Commission.

This matter should be placed upon an accelerated

appeals calendar and the petitioner hereby requests an order
specifically enforcing the weekly payment provisions as ordered
by the Industrial Commission, pending appeal herein.
-2-

WHEREFORE, petitioner requests a Writ of Review be
issued from this Court for the purpose of inquiring into the
lawfulness of the Industrial Commission's order and reviewing
the orders of the Industrial Commission and awarding petitioner
the permanent total benefits entitled to him at the appropriate
compensation rate, as provided by law, together with such other
and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.
DATED this ~2 7

day of September, 1985.
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Telephone: 801/533-8383

Attorney for Petitioner
2484L
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that copies of the foregoing
PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW were placed in the United States
mail, pos-tage prepaid, to the following persons on this / 7day of
' ;, , (
1985:
Office of the Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84114
Robert Finch, Esq.
559 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT
84102
Erie Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
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